Call for Contributions

Last year’s workshop addressed theoretical aspects of games in machine learning, their special dynamics, and typical challenges. Talks by Costis Daskalakis, Niao He, Jacob Abernethy and Paulina Grnarova emphasized various fundamental topics in a pure, simplified theoretical setting. A number of contributed talks and posters tackled similar questions. The workshop culminated in a panel discussion that identified a number of interesting questions. The aim of this workshop is to provide a platform for both theoretical and applied researchers from the ML, mathematical programming and game theory community to discuss the status of our understanding on the interplay between smooth games, their applications in ML, as well existing tools and methods for dealing with them. We are looking for contributions that identifies and discusses open, forward-looking problems of interest to the NeurIPS community.

We are soliciting contributions that address one of the below questions, or secondarily, another question on the intersection of modern machine learning and games. This year we are particularly interested in accepting work that uses non-standard formulations and applications for games in ML.

  • How can we integrate learning with game theory? (e.g. [Schuurmans et al., 2016])
  • How can we inject deep learning into games and vice-versa (eg. actor-critic formulations can be cast as a game)?
  • What are the practical implications and applications?
  • How do we go beyond the standard GAN discussion and model general agents that interact with each other in a learning context?
  • What can we say about the existence and uniqueness results of equilibria in smooth games?
  • Can we approximate mixed equilibria have better properties than the exact ones? [Arora, S., Ge, R., Liang, Y., Ma, T., Zhang, 2017] [Lipton et al., 2002]
  • Can we define a weaker notion of solution than Nash Equilibria? [Papadimitriou, Piliouras, 2018]
  • Can we compare the quality/performance of Nash equilibria/cycles ? Are there points that have a better quality/outcome than Nash equilibria ? [Kleinberg et al. 2011]
  • How do we design efficient algorithms that are guaranteed to achieve the desired solutions?
  • Finally, how do we design better objectives to match a specific ML task at hand?
  • Submission details

    A submission should take the form of an anonymous extended abstract (2-4 pages long excluding references) in PDF format using the following modified NeurIPS style. The submission process will be handled via CMT. Previously published work (or under-review) is acceptable, though it needs to be clearly indicated as published work when submitting. Please provide as a footnote in the actual pdf indicating the venue where the work has been submitted. Submissions can be accepted as contributed talks, spotlight or poster presentations (all accepted submissions can have a poster). Extended abstracts must be submitted by September 16, 2019 (11:59pm AoE). Final versions will be posted on the workshop website (and are archival but do not constitute a proceedings).

    Key Dates:

    • Abstract submission deadline: September 16, 2019 (11:59pm AoE) via CMT
    • Acceptance notification: October 1, 2019